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Anomaly detection in a Low-Power and Lossy Network (LLN) is important in light 
of threats such as a wormhole attack.  However, such detection is challenging given node 
constraints such as, for example, limited power and memory.  Techniques are presented 
herein that address those challenges thus benefiting the stability, reliability, and security of 
LLNs.  The presented techniques include, among other things, a distributed and light-
weight authentication method (where identification of a suspicious node is done locally, 
between two nodes, thus obviating heavy traffic upward to a root node) and a node rating 




The Wireless Smart Utility Network (Wi-SUN) alliance promotes Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.15.4g standards-based interoperability for 
the Internet of Things (IoT) in a LLN.   Such a network typically contains thousands of 
nodes, with each node having limited resources such as, for example, memory, energy, 
computing capability, etc.  Due to high quality of service (QoS) requirements in terms of 
low latency, low routing cost, low packet loss, etc., these constrained nodes attempt to 
select a preferred parent node as a default upward router. Thus, if an attacker compromises 
two legitimate nodes and claims it offers better conditions to be a parent, many other nodes 
will be deceived and will select a malicious node as their parent node. Then, the whole 
network may suffer from various kinds of wormhole attacks by the malicious nodes. 
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Figure 1: Illustrative LLN Network Topology 
 
Figure 1, above, illustrates an initial LLN network topology.  Two malicious nodes, 
node A and node C, then compromise the network, as shown in Figure 2, below. Node C 
will periodically broadcast false routing information in the neighborhood, thus deceiving 
the innocent nodes (i.e., D, E, F, G, J) into attaching to it.  Even though a security 
mechanism is used to protect the network, that is not secure enough for LLNs. For Wi-
SUN, a group key (e.g., GTK) is used to encrypt/decrypt media access control (MAC) 
frames. If the key is revealed or cracked by an attacker, any malicious node can easily 
become a wormhole node. Unfortunately, these kinds of attacks are very difficult to detect 
and prevent within the thousands of nodes in a LLN. 
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Figure 2: Compromised LLN Network Topology 
 
Techniques are presented herein that support a novel distributed light-weight 
authentication mechanism between two nodes to detect and prevent a wormhole attack in  
LLNs. 
As noted previously, a wormhole attack is very difficult to detect in LLNs. For 
example, according to the Routing Protocol for LLN (RPL), a child node will not change 
its parent node as long as the link quality or condition between them is good enough even 
though the upper layer's traffic may always fail due to a wormhole attack. In addition, the 
wormhole node will broadcast its false routing conditions to deceive its neighbor nodes to 
attach to it, such as, for example, a fake rank value and a fake hop count. 
To address these problems, along the lines of a zero trust network, aspects of the 
techniques presented herein make use of a distributed and tiny certification authentication 
to verify the suspicious L2 link security between two nodes.  Elements of particular interest 
and note within the techniques that are presented herein are discussed below. 
A first element includes a light-weight authentication method that leverages the 
existing certification between two connected nodes.  For example, in Wi-SUN the public 
key infrastructure is based on IEEE 802.1x and Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)-
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Transport Layer Security (TLS) using Initial Device Identifier (IDevID) concepts to 
provide secure device identity. Therefore, every node must have a root certificate that is 
signed by a Wi-SUN approved manufacturer certificate authority (CA).  Each node has its 
embedded node certification which is signed by a CA private key that is used to send to a 
server to verify its legal identity. In addition, within a personal area network (PAN) or a 
field area network (FAN) every node has the same CA public key to verify the legal identity 
of a server. Therefore, aspects of the techniques presented herein can make use of the 
existing node certification to verify the node legality between any two connected nodes 
when a node joins a FAN. For example, as shown in Figure 3, below, if Node A wants to 
check to see if Node B is a wormhole node it may send the node authentication request 
message to Node B. The two nodes may then exchange respective certifications and verify 
each other. As an additional layer of security, because the certification includes the identity 
information such as the owner's public key, the suspicious node could send a specific 
message signed by its private key after the node authentication process and the other node 
will use the public key in the adverse certification to decrypt the specific message.  If it 




Figure 3: Light-weight Authentication Method 
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A second element within the techniques that are presented herein comprises a rating 
credit rank mechanism for a node to determine the certification request initiation (e.g., 
when should a node start a certification request for its neighbor node?). 
In the beginning, a node considers that all of its neighbor nodes are reliable and 
grants them a fair credit rank value.  If any exceptional network phenomena arise – such 
as, for example, the dropping of numerous application packets, suddenly explosive traffic, 
strange topology changes, unexpected packet transmission, etc. – the credit rank value of 
a target node will be decreased accordingly. A specific timer may be employed to calculate 
this value periodically. If the credit rank value is lower than a fixed value, a node will 
trigger the timer event to start the node authentication request (as described above).  If such 
an authentication fails it may report the information to the root node, and the root node will 
double check and take the appropriate next step. 
For example, as illustrated in Figure 4, below, Node E finds that most of its 
application packets are dropped but the L2 link is very good. It may then start the node 
authentication mechanism with node D.  But it is not sure whether node D is a wormhole 
because any node in the upward path could be a malicious node. However, the node could 
detect the network attack and identify the suspicious upward path. 
A third element within the techniques that are presented herein comprises upward 
path verification – e.g., once a node detects a potential wormhole attack in the suspicious 
upward path, it requests its parent node complete certification authentication as described 
in the first element summary above. 
For example, as illustrated in Figure 4, below, after Node E finds that there is a 
wormhole attack in its upward path it will ask its parent node (Node D) for node 
authentication. If that authentication succeeds then Node D will ask its parent node (Node 
C) for node authentication. Finally, the wormhole node doesn't have the correct node 
certification and will be discovered by its child node. 
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Figure 4: Illustrative Node Authentication 
 
A fourth element within the techniques that are presented herein comprises 
distributed authentication.  A border router supervises the global network status, including 
the network topology, network traffic, and network congestion.  When it finds a suspicious 
node it will request that the node start the node authentication process with its neighbor 
nodes to verify its legality. 
This authentication process may happen anywhere, and may reduce network 
congestion and save network traffic. At the same time, based on zero trust network 
concepts, the wormhole nodes could be detected quickly in LLNs, which is not a time-
sensitive network. For example, as illustrated in Figure 5, below, the border router 
discovers that the Node C and Node L suddenly become many nodes' parent nodes and the 
network topology as such has changed. It then requests that their neighbor nodes (e.g., 
Node B and Node J, respectively) begin the node authentication request with Node C and 
Node L. If any node cannot provide the effective node certification for its neighbor node, 
it will be regarded as a malicious node. The authentication process takes place locally, 
which has limited influence on the global network performance. 
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Figure 5: Distributed Authentication 
 
A fifth element within the techniques that are presented herein comprises reporting.  
After a node discovers a malicious node around it, it will report the suspicious situation to 
the border router.  The border router has to double check if the suspicious node is really a 
malicious node or not.  If it is, the border router must refresh the group key process in LLNs 
to prevent the continuous wormhole attack. 
In summary, techniques herein provide a new light-weighted authentication 
mechanism that may complement security methods for anomaly detection in LLNs.  
Anomaly detection can be facilitated through a preliminary judgement locally by a node 
itself and validation of the identity legality of a suspicious node can be performed between 
two nodes, which provides a traffic savings to the root node.  If the validation fails, the 
failure can then be reported to the root node to take a next step.  Thus, the presented 
techniques leverage the existing certification between two connected nodes (allowing 
identification of a suspicious node to be done locally, between two nodes, thus obviating 
heavy traffic upward to a root node), employ a rating credit rank mechanism, support 
upward path verification, and employ distributed authentication. 
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